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The paper argues that Zambian political parties have ascribed convenient identities to China in 
order to justify their quest for political office. Ruling parties realise the ideological and 
economic importance of China and hence support Sino-Zambian ties. Opposition parties 
denounce China with the aim of inflaming the sensibilities of ordinary Zambians who feel 
threatened especially by the recent increase of Chinese migrants who are perceived as threats 
to Zambian small scale entrepreneurship. The paper draws the conclusion that it is convenient 
for opposition parties in Zambia to construct and promote a negative identity of China to win 
the support of ordinary Zambians. The Patriotic Front has shown that, once in power, parties 
are more likely to change their stance on China because of pragmatic ambitions and a sense of 
resignation as China will increasingly be involved in, and have influence on, Zambia’s political 
and economic future.  














Otto von Bismarck is credited to have said that whoever rules Africa will rule the world. It may 
be argued by its critics and detractors that China has taken this assertion to heart and it inspires 
China’s growing involvement in African affairs (Campbell, 2008).i Most analysis on the 
deepening relations between Africa and China claims to be clairvoyant with Sino-optimists 
arguing that China’s incursions into Africa bode ill for the continent and Sino-optimists lauding 
these relations as more amenable than the skewed relations between Africa and its erstwhile 
colonisers and the capitalist North America. Some Western media and scholarship on the 
“China in Africa” discourse have argued that China intends to exploit Africa for self-serving 
reasons (Malone, 2008). While African governments have generally been sanguine about the 
evolving and deepening Africa-China relationship, some opposition politicians have seized this 
opportunity to further their political ambitions.  
Zambia is one of the countries where opposition politicians have whipped up emotions against 
China in order to gain political mileage. It is convenient to denounce China as an indictment 
on ruling parties. The current article will demonstrate how constructions of Chinese identity 
and interests in Zambia do not only stem from conviction but have been exploited for political 
influence and support. While opposition political parties have decried Sino-Zambian relations, 
once in government these parties have realised the inevitability of retaining China’s presence. 
Aided by the widening scale of its investment in Zambia, China could safely be said to be 
intrinsic to Zambia’s economic survival. This points to the resignation that is felt by both the 
national leadership and Zambians working for Chinese firms who argue that without China’s 
involvement they would be unemployed.  
There have been convenient constructions of China’s identity depending on the political 
standing of the individuals attributing these identities. While opposition parties have been 
inclined to denounce China with the hope that Zambians who are leery of Chinese investment 
and feel crowded out in small business ventures would adhere to their views, ruling parties 
have had counter arguments. Once in government, political parties promote China and its 
citizens as endowed with characteristics of hard work and adaptability which could help 
Zambia and Zambians if adopted. Furthermore, China does not have a legacy of colonialism in 
Zambia and hence its relations are deemed relations between countries with a similar history 
facing intersecting challenges. In addition, China’s economic importance to Zambia has been 
an important feature in the maintenance of state-to-state relations which essentially means 
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erstwhile critics of China, once in government, foreswear their hostility towards China. The 
current article will give a history of Zambia-China relations from the time they were established 
in 1964 to date. China’s identity within the different epochs will be noted. After a presentation 
of the different epochs, the penultimate section will thus clarify how political players have 
identified China and thus attributed to it interests that suited those identities. The section will 
also reveal how expediency and resignation have influenced how ruling political parties in 
Zambia have looked at China in a more positive manner.  
 
The Kaunda Years: The Power of Ideological Affinity 
China and Zambia established relations on 29 October 1964, less than a week after Zambia 
gained independence from Britain (Leslie, 2016). It is noteworthy that at the time these 
relations were instituted, much of Southern Africa, where Zambia is situated, was still under 
colonial or settler rule (Shaw, 1979). The People’s Republic of China was only fifteen years 
old and was not at the time a member of the United Nations Security Council. Beyond these 
national circumstances, this period was characterized by the Cold War, an ideological 
animosity between the capitalist West comprising the United States and Western Europe and 
the Communist bloc whose main player was the Union of Soviet Socialist States (henceforth 
referred to as USSR or Soviet Union).  
The nascent stages of Zambia’s existence were characterized by building and fortifying the 
nation but also by a bigger task of helping other nations in Southern Africa to also gain 
independence. Many liberation movements like South Africa’s African National Congress 
(ANC), Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Namibia’s South West 
African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) were based in Zambia at some time when they were 
proscribed in their countries (Ellis, 2012). At a global stage, therefore, Zambia found itself 
pitted against colonial powers that were coincidentally capitalist. China was a natural ally for 
such a country; though poor at the time, it offered modest material support to independence 
movements and its ideology, driven by Mao Zedong, was decidedly anti-colonialist and anti-
imperialist. Unlike many Africa countries that espoused socialism after independence, Zambia 
adopted an ideology known as humanism, which was a combination of socialist tendencies, 
African modes of living and Christian ethics (Kaunda, 1966).  
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Even though Kaunda fell shy of declaring Zambia a socialist country, the economic practice 
that was obtaining in the country at the time bore striking resemblances to overt socialism. On 
ideological lines, therefore, China and Zambia shared a bond. In a Humanist in Africa (1966) 
Kaunda expressed his awareness that imperialism was not the sole preserve of capitalist 
powers. This caveat was prompted by the seeming attitude of socialist organisations and 
countries that courted the socialist bloc with the conviction that socialism was inherently at 
variance with colonialism and that imperialism was the exclusive preserve of certain (Western) 
players (Hevi, 1967). Kaunda argued that the affinity that African states shared with socialist 
powers was strengthened by the fact that colonial powers were mostly capitalist and that even 
powers like the United States of America that never colonised Africa had an equivocal attitude 
towards the struggle against colonialism (Kaunda, 1966).  
If relations among nations are necessitated by the identities and interests of the nations involved 
(Wendt, 1992), then Zambia-China relations during Kaunda were bolstered by shared identities 
and interests. Some nations that did not feature prominently in the Cold War dichotomy formed 
what was known as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Though China only has observer 
status in the NAM, it considers itself as part of the Global South, a region that roughly 
comprises the Third World. China was also an influential presence at the Bandung Conference 
of 1955 whose participants formed a significant percentage of the NAM (Atwi-Boateg, 2017). 
These identities continue to play a pivotal role in maintaining relations between the countries 
to this day. South-South and Third World identities bred intersecting interests in Zambia-China 
relations.  
The main intentions of the NAM were the maintenance of national sovereignty and the struggle 
against colonialism and neo-colonialism. China pronounced itself an adherent of these ideals, 
and to this day, China’s foreign policy is well known for its stance on non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other nations. The overriding interest that China and Zambia had immediately 
after independence was to end colonial and settler rule in Southern Africa and elsewhere where 
these systems still lingered. China’s contribution to building the Tanzania-Zambia Railway 
was arguably the biggest demonstration of its solidarity to the Third World struggle against 
colonial and settler rule (Song, 2015). Zambia’s gratitude towards China for this gesture 
remains to this day.   
Tanzania’s first president – Julius Nyerere - had approached the United States and Western 
Institutions for investment into building a railway line that would run from the Kapiri Mposhi 
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district of the Central Province of Zambia to the Coastal region of Dar es Salaam in East 
Tanzania (Song, 2015). The railway was not only to be an economic installation; its rationale 
was also based on ideology and the fight against settler rule. Zambia is a landlocked country 
and after independence it mainly depended on the sea route that passed through Southern 
Rhodesia (later called Zimbabwe) and South Africa. This route was the main channel for 
sending exports and receiving imports. Kaunda’s stance against settler rule put Zambia in an 
invidious position. Zambia was a seminal player of the struggle against Apartheid South Africa 
and Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Thus, Kaunda sought to have a 
railway line that would go north of Zambia and hence end dependence on settler-ruled 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Western refusal to help in this venture was interpreted as Western 
acquiescence in the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia.  
During his visit to China in 1965, Nyerere broached the topic of the railway and China readily 
accepted to head the project despite it (China) being a poor country at the time (da Cruz, 2017). 
Kaunda also made appeals to China and obtained a favourable response during his visit to 
China in January 1967. China’s commitment to the TAZARA project was a massive boost to 
its reputation to the Third World cause and was indicative of China’s indubitable solidarity 
with the fight for self-determination (Scott, 2019). This was more so because China was a poor 
country while The United States, West Germany, Britain and the World Bank that had more 
financial resources had refused to fund the project. In addition to this, by default, one of the 
common features between Zambia and China, after 1972 was that both countries were one-
party state polities. All the factors mentioned coalesced to form a relationship between China 
and Zambia that Kaunda described as a bond between “all-weather friends.” At an international 
level, China’s contribution to Africa was massively awarded in 1971 when 26 of African 
nations voted for China as the de jure representative of the Chinese people at the United Nations 
Security Council and China acceded to that position. The 26 African nations that supported 
China represented 34% of the General Assembly (Leslie, 2016).  
After the death of Mao, in 1976, the Chinese Communist Party sought to move China from the 
ideological straitjacket into which Mao had confined it (Yahuda, 2016). The rehabilitation of 
Deng Xiaoping, who was one of the purged victims of China’s Cultural Revolution, was one 
of the most telling decisions by the CCP due to the impact that Deng was to have on China. In 
1978 China started making reforms. In addition to domestic reforms, external circumstances 
had an auspicious impact on China. The Sino-Soviet split that had influenced Soviet and 
Chinese involvement in the Third World was waning. The pragmatism that China began to 
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exude after Mao encouraged China to seek close ties even with capitalist nations as long as 
they could help China’s economic and industrial advancement (Yahuda, 2016). Thus, relations 
between China and Africa changed in the 1980s. Even though ideological solidarity was still 
evoked, post-Mao China was a more pragmatic player that sought incentives that African 
nations could offer. Relations between China and Zambia did not completely decline; indeed, 
it was in the 1980s that China invested in the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile. This came at 
the time when at continental level Afro-Chinese relations had substantially been toned down 
(Taylor, 2006). The identity that China assumed after 1978 was acknowledged and appreciated 
by the West. Mann argues that even the subject of human rights, which had been the pith of 
Sino-Western animosity was receiving less attention because China had painstakingly built an 
appealing identity (Mann, 2000). The United States, for example, continued to denounce the 
Soviet Union for what it thought were human rights abuses by the Soviet leadership but China 
was spared of this censure.  
The Tiananmen Square Crisis of 1989 proved to be a body blow to China’s standing in the 
West. Chinese students and workers started protests in early 1989 demanding for more political 
liberties from the Chinese government. On June 4 1989 the Chinese government sent in military 
personnel to end the protests. The violence that ensued engendered a lot of casualties on the 
protesters. This manner of dealing with dissent was redolent of the violence that typified China 
during the Mao era. The hostility of the Communist Party towards dissension was especially 
exposed when the Politburo convened two weeks after the June 4 Incident to divest Zhao 
Ziyang of his positions. Zhao was accused of dividing the party by taking a sympathetic view 
of the protesters (Jones, 2014). By its response to the protests, China forfeited Western 
goodwill and embargoes were imposed on it. China interpreted the Western reaction as 
demonstrating the meddlesome inclination of Western powers in the internal affairs of poorer 
countries and former colonies. For this reason, China sought African sympathy, taking full 
advantage of Africa’s sensitive attitude towards Western interference and intervention in Third 
World politics. The late 1980s were also characterized by changes both in the international 
system in general and Southern Africa in particular. South Africa and South West Africa (later 
called Namibia) were the only countries that were still under settler rule, with Namibia 
receiving its official independence in March 1990.  
The emerging external changes in Southern Africa impinged on Zambia’s internal politics. 
When Kaunda declared Zambia a one-party democracy, he adduced at least two reasons. 
Expectedly, others have argued that one of Kaunda’s reasons for the change to a single party 
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system was “to crystallise the dominance of UNIP (United National Independence Party) over 
all areas of social, economic and political life in Zambia” (McCorley, 2013). His first reason 
was that multiparty democracy as adopted from the West is “a beautiful anachronism – a pattern 
ideally suited to the genius of the British people but of limited value, without drastic 
modifications, in Modern Africa” (Kaunda, 1966: 106). He argued that opposition political 
parties in Africa were not suitable alternative governments in that they were mainly driven by 
“a ragbag of disgruntled individuals and tribalists” (:107). Even though he had tolerated a 
multiparty system for the first eight years of his rule, Kaunda argued that the institution of a 
one-party democracy was “a natural consequence” (ibid).  
In addition to internal factors, Kaunda also argued that if Zambia was to maintain its 
commitment to liberation in Southern Africa, then it needed a political system that would give 
unequivocal support to independence movements. This was an understandable argument 
because Zambia was a poor country and its involvement in regional politics was costly. Thus, 
opposition political parties could opportunistically seize on this and convince Zambian citizens 
that the ruling government’s priorities were diverted elsewhere rather than in Zambia. Both 
these internal and external factors were shifting in the 1980s. The decline in Soviet influence 
and the gradual ending of the Cold War brought a wave of neoliberal democracy and hence the 
call for a multiparty political system and the shift towards neoliberal markets practices grew 
more strident in Zambia. Secondly, South African representatives of government and the 
private sector began negotiations with banned liberation movements, with some talks 
happening in Zambia (Gervisser, 2009).  
In 1990 the Nationalist government rescinded the ban on South African liberation movements 
and announced the release of some political prisoners. These changes effectively eliminated 
one basis on which Kaunda had instituted the one-party system. Thus, Kaunda opened up the 
political space in Zambia and multiparty elections were held in 1991 at which the Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by an erstwhile union leader Frederick Chiluba defeated 
Kaunda and his United National Independence in Party (UNIP). From the foregoing, it can be 
deduced that Kaunda was appreciative of China’s involvement in Zambia and Africa and that, 
despite a thaw in China’s commitment to Africa after Mao, Zambia still held a place in China’s 
priorities. The intersecting identities of third world solidarity and the interests of ending 
colonial, settler and foreign domination fortified relations between the two countries from 
breaking down. The ensuing section looks at how the MMD government and China maintained 




The MMD Government and China 
The dominance of the United States and Western Europe in the 1980s on global politics was 
accompanied by the success of capitalist economics to the detriment of socialism. These 
changes impacted on Zambia and the UNIP government experimented with Structural 
Adjustment Programmes though it reneged after the experiment backfired (McCorley 2013). 
Zambia’s dependency on copper tested UNIP’s hold on power. Labour unions in Zambia have 
had an influential history on politics. The economy of the country was mainly dependent on 
the price of copper on the global market and the scale of production at home. Thus, mining 
unions could dictate or at least influence local policy depending on whether or not there was 
enough labour in the mines. It is from this background that in the late 1980s the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was playing the role of an opposition party to the Kaunda 
government. The mines decried the pseudo socialism that Kaunda practised. The protests that 
erupted after Kaunda flirted with Structural Adjustment Programmes by removing government 
subsidies compounded people’s restiveness with UNIP. The emerging political system was 
also exacerbated by the factors discussed written about in the previous section.   
Chiluba went on to form the MMD which was to run against UNIP at the 1991 polls. The MMD 
“won well over two-thirds of the votes in the first two elections held in 1991 and 1996” 
(Masaki, 2018: 63). The party promised a departure from Kaunda’s economic and political 
practices. It promised liberalisation of the economy and privatisation of strategic parastatals in 
deference to Structural Adjustment Programmes. Apart from the evident triumph of neoliberal 
democracy and economics, the dissolution of the USSR and the post-Cold War changed the 
international political structure. The United States emerged as an unrivalled sole superpower. 
However, this gave an opportunity for regional or middle powers to augment their influence in 
their respective regions (Cooper, 2016). To date, China is the most influential of these powers 
and its economic progress has ensured that China has extended its reach from Asia to the rest 
of the world. This had an impact on Zambia-China relations. Zambia’s shift to neoliberalism 
created space for the Chinese government and corporations to invest in the country. Though 
China still remains a one-party state, it respected Zambia’s return to multiparty politics and 




While the wave of neoliberal democracy was spreading in a lot of places in the world, China’s 
reaction to the Tiananmen Crisis in 1989 proved just how hostile the Chinese leadership was 
to political reform. Being a pragmatic power that it is, it respected partners like Zambia that 
had opted to embrace political pluralism. Chiluba initially planned to cultivate relations with 
Taiwan but later decided against it after noting the enormous amount of money that Zambia 
owed China (Ngoma-Leslie 2016). Added to this could be that China’s economy was gathering 
a lot of momentum and that Taiwan is not recognised by the United Nations and thus opting 
for it at the expense of mainland China was essentially going against the general practise of 
global diplomacy. The One-China policy is the most sacrosanct of China’s foreign policies and 
conditions and hence any country that opts for relations with Taiwan is essentially renouncing 
relations with China. In addition, the CCP leadership realised after the Tiananmen Crisis that 
the fate of the regime was tied to economic advancement. Hence, China also embarked on 
loosening the economy in a fashion similar to the MMD’s market policy. Deng Xiaoping’s 
Southern Tour (1992) was aimed at extending market reforms, attracting foreign investment 
and shedding the dogmatic understanding of socialism (Zheng and Peng, 2015).  
For a country that sought to strengthen its economy, maintaining relations with China was 
beneficial for Zambia. China’s industrialisation programme and economic progress demanded 
a ready supply of mineral and energy resources that Africa is endowed with (Eisenman 2015). 
Thus, after the ideological affinities of the Cold War era had ceased to be the main basis for 
Sino-Zambian amity, economic interests were the overriding factor during the tenure of the 
MMD in Zambia. It is during the rule of the MMD that the number of private Chinese citizens 
coming to Zambia started to increase. China made some unprecedented inroads in Zambia. It 
was in Zambia that China established its first Special Economic Zone in Africa. A Confucius 
Institute was added to the University of Zambia (Kopiński and Polus, 2012) and the Bank of 
China (Zambia) became the first in Africa to conduct transactions using Chinese currency 
(Ngoma Leslie 2016). It is noteworthy that during his 2007 multinational visit to Africa, the 
then President of China (Hu Jintao) spent most of his time in Zambia. His extended stay in 
Zambia underlined Zambia’s importance to China (Kopiński and Polus 2012).  
In sum, the twenty year-rule of the MMD government in Zambia saw a steady shift of Sino-
Zambian relations from ones based on ideology and anti-colonial sentiment to pragmatism and 
reaction to the emerging world order. South-South cooperation has been gaining traction since 
the end of the Cold War and China is the most principal player among states that identify 
themselves as members of the South (Esteves, and Assunção, 2014). The conduct of Western 
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players in Africa, especially towards leaderships that they consider odious, has given China an 
opportunity to offer respite to Africa leaderships that are enduing Western sanctions.  
While the West considers its measures as condign punishments for errant governments, African 
nations consider Western sanctions as actions of meddlesome and hawkish powers and thus 
want to reduce their dependency on Western powers and institutions (Ayodele and Sotola 
2014). After the EU-Africa Summit of December 2007, Levy Mwanawasa stated that Africa 
had “turned to the East” because the West had let it down (Asia News 2009). The MMD’s time 
as governing party, run by Frederick Chiluba (1991-2001), Levy Mwanawasa (2001-2008) and 
Rupiah Banda (2008-2011) maintained very close relations with China, despite the changes in 
the internal politics of the two countries and changes at the international level too. 
While the MMD government came to power with promises of modernising Zambia’s economy 
and entrenching democracy, the main legacy of the MMD government has been corruption, 
which was rife during the Chiluba and Banda era, with a hiatus during Mwanawasa’s rule. 
Allegations of corruption were particularly profound during Rupiah Banda’s rule to the extent 
that “the Global Fund suspended health assistance and the European Union halted aid for road 
construction citing corruption in the country” (Reuters 2010). Rupiah Banda responded by 
stating that “We must not allow donors to feel they can interfere in the internal affairs of this 
country because it is a sovereign and independent state (ibid).” His response is typical of 
African leaders who have favourably hailed China’s non-interference policy.  
Apart from being considered a non-interfering player, China’s growing involvement in Africa 
has been used to inveigh against Western involvement and interference in Africa. At the 2015 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in South Africa, the then President of 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, stated that China was doing in Africa what colonisers were 
expected to do by way of rectifying their negative impact on Africa (Mugabe 2017). Thus, 
Zambia-China relations are somewhat a manifestation of the general scope and tenor of Africa-
China relations which have mainly been regarded as mutually beneficial by state actors.  
Despite enjoying cordial relations, Zambia-China relations have the distinction of experiencing 
conflict between Chinese nationals and Zambian labour workers whose extent has seldom been 
experienced anywhere else on the African continent. These disputes have been caused by real 
concerns regarding China’s labour practices; however, they have also been caused by 
constructions of negative identities and interests of China by opposition political parties in 
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Zambia. Michael Sata was the main influence behind exposing the downside of the Sino-
Zambian nexus.  
 
Michael Sata’s Anti-Chinese Campaign 
Michael Sata was a member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) up to 2001. 
Towards the end of his constitutional two terms in office, Chiluba sought to amend the 
constitution so that he could run for a third term. His intentions were thwarted by both the 
political fraternity and civil society. He then picked Levy Mwanawasa as his successor, 
bypassing Michael Sata who at the time was a more visible member of MMD. In a fit of pique 
Sata left the MMD and formed the Patriotic Front (PF) a few months before the 2001 general 
election (Chan, 2014). He went on to contest four elections losing the first three to MMD 
candidates and eventually winning the fourth attempt in September 2011.  
Levy Mwanawasa’s legacy in Zambian politics is tied to his “zero tolerance” stance on 
corruption (Kalusa 2017).  Mwanawasa earned a lot of plaudits for encouraging the prosecution 
of those within his party who were accused of corruption. Even more admirable was the 
prosecution of Chiluba, the man who had handpicked Mwanawasa as his successor. Thus, Sata 
could not discredit Mwanawasa’s government under the pretext that it was corrupt or 
demonstrated a cavalier attitude towards individuals who were corrupt. China’s relations with 
Zambia, Chinese investment and the growing number of Chinese nationals migrating to Zambia 
gave Sata an opportune reason to attack Mwanawasa’s leadership.  
The anti-Chinese sentiment that Michael Sata stoked precipitated a diplomatic crisis in the run 
up to the 2006 general election in Zambia. On his campaign trail, Sata inveighed against 
China’s presence in Zambia, calling the Chinese “infesters” in lieu of investors. Sata’s populist 
attack gained resonance with the Zambian public when a series of accidents in firms that are 
owned and run by Chinese and mutual killings between Chinese employers and their Zambian 
employees over wage disputes and safety measures became rife and perilous. Even more 
alarming was Sata’s allegation that under the watch of the MMD government "Zambia has 
become a province of China," and that “The Chinaman is coming just to invade and exploit 
Africa" (French 2011).  
Guy Scott, who was Michael Sata’s deputy in opposition, also toed the same line, asserting that 
China is “out to colonise Africa economically and also to get Africa’s solidarity at the United 
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Nations” (Lusaka Times, 2 February 2007). The nub of the crisis that Sata precipitated was his 
public description of Taiwan as a sovereign state and his threat to recognise it as such once 
elected to power in 2006. As alluded to already, the reunification of mainland China and 
Taiwan has been one of the China’s non-negotiable foreign policies. The One-China policy 
does not brook recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state and China does not have relations 
with any country that has formal ties with Taiwan (Yun, 2014). Thus, Sata’s preference for 
relations with Taiwan was essentially aimed at relinquishing formal ties with China.  
Sata lost the 2006 election and riots broke out in Lusaka and the Copperbelt province where he 
garnered most of his votes. It is also noteworthy that at the time, Chinese nationals and 
investment were mainly based in the two provinces. The post-election protest and voting 
patterns in the two provinces were indications of discontentment with Chinese investment from 
those who interacted with the Chinese. 2007 added another curious dimension to Sino-Zambian 
relations. During his 2007 visit to Zambia, Hu Jintao was also scheduled to open a Special 
Economic Zone in Zambia, the first of its kind in Africa (Kopiński and Polus, 2012). However, 
he did not go to open the Zone for fear that there would be protests against him and China in 
general. The curious nature of relations between China and Zambia has been compounded by 
the fact that China’s identity in Zambia is constructed depending on where those who are 
attributing identities to China stand in terms of political positions. The penultimate section will 
delve deeper into this argument. After 2008, up to the time he won the election in 2011, Sata 
had toned down his rhetoric against the Chinese. Arguably, this was because the MMD after 
the death of Mwanawasa in 2008 relapsed to the rank corruption that was its main characteristic 
during the Chiluba years. It is telling that accusations of Rupiah Banda being incapable of 
fighting corruption were made even before he became an active president of Zambia (Kalusa, 
2017:1143). For this reason, Sata had reduced his criticism of Chinese investment and presence 
and instead started focused on allegations of corruption during Banda’s leadership. 
 
The Patriotic Front Government and China 
The victory of Michael Sata in 2011 was regarded as an indictment on China’s increasing 
presence in Zambia even though, as referred to before, Sata had toned down his anti-Chinese 
rhetoric. For example, journalist Masterson averred that Sata’s accession to the presidency 
betokened the first time when the electorate voiced their dissatisfaction on China’s relations 
with Africa (Masterson, 2011). Masterson’s piece was written a mere few days after Sata won 
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the election. The depth that relations between Sata’s PF and China reached after 2011 
controverted the arguments of those who espoused the view that Sata would take a hard line 
against China. What ensued was the strengthening of relations between the two countries and 
it is an instructive fact that the Chinese ambassador to Zambia was one of Sata’s first guests at 
State House. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Sata was well-known for recoiling from 
embarking on state visits or attending international events in other countries. This 
notwithstanding, he adhered to Xi Jinping’s week-long visit to China in April 2013. The 
Chinese ambassador to Zambia, Zhou Yuxiao intimated “that the invitation of a state visit to 
China extended to the Zambian president by President Jinping barely twenty days after the 
inauguration of the new Chinese leadership indicates the great importance China attaches to its 
relations with Zambia” (Lusaka Times, 28 March 2013). 
Those who might accuse Sata of backpedalling miss the argument that identities can be 
constructed, sometimes for convenient reasons as Sata did at the time when denouncing China 
was fashionable in order to gain political mileage. On the international political scene, China 
has successfully won the diplomatic war against Taiwan. Thus, it would be against the trend of 
international politics for a country to renounce relations with China in favour of Taiwan. For 
economic reasons, China also offers more promise to its partners than Taiwan could. Thus, 
Sata appreciated these practical realities and his actions demonstrate a pragmatic streak in his 
politics. The Link Zambia 8000 initiative, which is aimed at bolstering Zambia’s road network 
was initiated during Sata’s presidency. Chinese corporations were tasked with leading the 
project. Apart from that, the construction of Ndola International Airport and improvements on 
the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport are all being tackled by Chinese corporations.  
Despite maintaining and improving economic relations with China, the Patriotic Front 
displayed some measure of agency. In conversation with a Chinese delegation, Sata urged that 
“all investors coming to Zambia should bring a limited number of experts” (Sata, 2011) This 
was a caveat to the growing discomfort from ordinary Africans and politicians that China has 
penchant for sending a labour force to Africa to occupy positions that can easily be filled in by 
ordinary Africans and Zambians in particular. The PF made some commitments to moderate 
certain features of Chinese investment, like doubling mineral royalties and attaching mineral 
tax to production in lieu of sales. Under these circumstances, China has demonstrated a 
readiness to abide by certain conditions set by Zambia. For economic, political and diplomatic 




Exposing Convenient and Opportunistic Standpoints 
There is no gainsaying that some of the allegations against Chinese investment and the quality 
of Chinese labour practices correlate with reality. It is also arguable that some of those who 
condemn China’s incursions into Africa are genuinely persuaded by their rhetoric and 
literature. Those of Zambian extraction like Sata, Scott and Harry Kalaba who have taken 
markedly different stands on China depending on their political positions have shown how 
expedient Zambia’s attitude is towards China. This expediency is also laced with a measure of 
resignation because it seems indubitable that China will continue to play a seminal role in the 
complexion of Zambia’s political landscape and will equally have bearing on Zambia’s 
economic trajectory. However, despite the possibility of conviction on the part of Zambian 
politicians who have inveighed against the growing influence of China in Zambia, this 
discourse has also been (ab)used by ambitious politicians to discredit their competitors.  
Hess and Aidoo have argued that Sata played “the Chinese card” in order to win the support 
and fealty of disenchanted Zambians who found in Chinese nationals a pretext for abusive 
labour practices, unemployment and economic weakness (Hess and Aidoo, 2015). It is argued 
that opportunism, especially on the part of those who seek to be in government but are not, has 
been a feature in denouncing China in Zambia. A good example was how in 2016 Harry Kalaba, 
an erstwhile minister of home affairs, gushed over Chinese investment in Africa and Zambia. 
However, after resigning from government, he went on to criticise China for fostering the 
migration of Chinese nationals who were venturing into economic activities that could easily 
be done by Zambians.  
The conflicting perceptions of China’s identity in Africa have pitted people between Sino-
optimists and Sino-pessimists (Atwi-Boateng 2017). Zambian politicians have shifted their 
position depending on how they are placed in the country. While in opposition, they have 
portrayed China as a rogue investor. Evidence of how they have targeted China after coming 
to power shows that they have constructed these identities of China to discredit their political 
rivals i.e. ruling parties. Once in government, they have realised China’s importance to Zambia. 
Both Chiluba and Sata denounced China before coming to power, but once in power realised 
how indispensable China and its investment are in Zambia. While this points to expediency, it 
also hints at resignation on the part of Zambian politicians. Thus, convenient condemnation of 
China has been a mobilising tool for opposition political parties. Once elected president, 
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Michael Sata painted a positive picture of especially ordinary Chinese who come to Zambia 
and are poised to withstand privations that Zambians avoid. During his tour to the United 
Kingdom, he argued that China and its citizens have succeeded because of their work ethic and 
adaptive nature (Sata, 2012).    
While the government has changed its stance due to political convenience and China’s 
importance to Zambia’s infrastructure and economic ambitions, ordinary Zambians still retain 
some measure of discomfort towards ordinary Chinese especially. A number of reasons could 
be adduced to explain this attitude. Ordinary Zambians interact with ordinary Chinese who 
come at their own initiative whose identity and interest (as they appear to ordinary Zambians) 
are not necessarily in tandem with the identity that China claims to have and interest it claims 
to pursue at the level of the state. Secondly, at the level of state-to-state relations, China is a 
growing superpower and with that comes the responsibility of being a political, economic and 
social example to the rest of the world. Thus, China will increasingly endeavour to cultivate a 
national identity that appeals not only to the controversial regimes that it offers respite from 
Western nations and institutions, but to its competitors as well. This, however, need not be in 




The article undertook to present how China’s identity has been constructed in the Zambian 
political discourse. Additionally, the article argued that constructions of Chinese identity in 
Zambian politics reek of opportunism on the part of Zambian politicians and that ruling parties 
in Zambia relate with China out of both expediency and resignation. It has also been noted that 
China evokes both positive and negative attitudes from Zambian political players depending 
on the position that those players occupy on the Zambian political scene. The main difference 
has been that while ruling parties have maintained relations with China, those who are not in 
power have criticised China’s investment in Zambia. Another observation that the paper has 
made is that there is a shifting dynamic of China’s identity in Zambia because of the increasing 
number of Chinese migrants in Zambia. 
At the level of state interaction, China’s identity in Zambia was divided according to the main 
political changes that have happened in Zambia since it gained independence in 1964. During 
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the Kaunda years, China assumed the identity of a third world kindred player that was fiercely 
committed towards ending colonial and settler rule. Its ideological compatibility with Zambia 
took on a material manifestation with the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway line. 
The China that Zambia interacted with in the Third Republic starting from 1991 was a China 
that had shed some of its ideological extremism in favour of economic growth and integration 
into the world economy. This epoch coincided with the deepening sentiment on south-south 
cooperation and Africa’s experiment with alternative growth models after the Western-bred 
Structural Adjustment Programmes did not bear expected dividends for countries of the south.  
The MMD government was sanguine about China’s growth and its deepening economic 
relations (Mhandara, Manyeruke and Nyemba, 2013). In 2007 Levy Mwanawasa stated at the 
Africa-EU Summit in Portugal that Africa had turned to the East after the West neglected it. 
This could also be read in the context of attitudes such as those expressed by The Economist 
that Africa was a hopeless continent (The Economist, May 2011). In this context, China’s 
interest in Africa was greeted with alacrity. These were the prevailing conditions when the 
MMD was in government. The Patriotic Front government (which came to power in 2011) has 
continued and deepened economic relations with China despite having vehemently campaigned 
on an anti-Chinese platform in its initial campaigns.  
The negative attitudes towards China, though understandable, have been seized upon to whip 
up the emotions of ordinary Zambians who interact with migrants from China. During his time 
as leader of the opposition, Michael Sata’s stance on China cast a blight on the Sino-Zambian 
relationship. With the advantage of hindsight, it is safe to argue that convenient denunciations, 
despite being occasionally justifiable, have been aimed at shoring up support for political 
parties that aim to take over power from incumbent leaderships. Furthermore, the complex 
identity of China at state and subnational level make the positive and negative identities 
attached to China apocryphal. Finally, evidence that Zambia and China have relations that 
expose Zambia’s pragmatic but also resigned attitude towards China has been rendered legion. 
Despite its controversial labour practices, China and its citizens give certain Zambians 
employment opportunities that they would otherwise never have because of the failure of the 
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